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Abstract. Grid computing allows sharing of services and resources ac-
cross institutions. However, current Grid security mechanisms for au-
thentication and authorization are too rigid and they lack the ability to
determine how “trustworthy” the result obtained from a specific provider
is likely to be. This paper describes the different facets associated to
Trust and identifies the need for Trust Management approaches in the
context of Virtual Organizations lifecycle and resource access control in
the Grid.
1 Introduction
A key theme in Grid computing is the capability to share services (representing
different kinds of expertise) distributed across multiple institutions, and gen-
erally referred to as a “Virtual Organisation” (VO). When integrating services
across multiple partners that form a VO, both security and trust issues become
significant. The following questions may be used to describe the key requirements
that arise:
– Case I: Do I allow user X to use my resources? If so, what requirements must
be satisfied by such a user?
– Case II: Do I believe what Provider A says is true and factual?
– Case III: Do I agree with the answer that is provided by a Provider or Group?
– Case IV: Do I believe that a Provider or Group goals and/or priorities match
mine?
From these requirements, we can see that Case I relates to the issue of security
credentials and policy protection – i.e. whether a particular service provider
allows an external user to make use of its resources. Significant work has already
been undertaken within the Grid community in this area – generally through
the use of X509-based digital certificates to verify identity. Cases II, III and IV
refer to issues that are not directly related to security – as they involve a more
deeper understanding of the interactions taking place between a provider and
user.
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Current trend in Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) is to enable trust rela-
tionships to be established in the Grid community – generally through the use
of X509-based digital certificates, and more recently, through the use of security
assertions (SAML) and role-based access management (PERMIS and Shibbo-
leth). However, such security mechanisms still do not scale. Among the existing
problems we can identify mechanisms that are too rigid for authentication and
authorization, in terms of access control (Case I), and they lack the ability to de-
termine how “trustworthy” the result obtained from a specific provider is likely
to be. Therefore, generally they are not able to address Cases II, III and IV
identified above.
Trust management provides us with the basis to overcome these points of
view. However, the general notion of “trust” is excessively complex, and appears
to have many different meanings depending on how it is used. Trust is seen as a
multifaceted issue and may be related to other themes such as risk, competence,
security, beliefs and perceptions, utility and benefit, and expertise. In addition,
policy-based trust management is understood as statements guiding a process
where two strangers are able to commit a specific transaction. Therefore, the
aim of this paper is to identify the advantages/uses/requirements/threads of
applying trust on Grid computing from the following two complementary points
of view:
– Access Control: some of the existing problems can be addressed by extend-
ing Grid Security Infrastructure with trust negotiation mechanisms. These
extensions, can provide the Grid with property-based authorization mecha-
nisms, automatic gathering of required certificates, bidirectional and itera-
tive security negotiations and policy based authorizations.
– Provision of Service: the notion of trust transcends beyond the restrictive
security issues that are currently being explored in the Grid community.
Where security issues are primarily concerned with ensuring that the result
being provided is to come from a traceable source, trust issues can also relate
to the degree of belief a user has in a particular provider, and is therefore
much more subjective in nature. Some questions to be answered would be:
“Can a trust rating be associated with a Grid Service? If so, how is this
calculated and what does it mean?”
2 Related Work
The term trust management, introduced in [6] as “a unified approach to specify-
ing and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships which allow
direct authorization of security-critical actions”, has been given later a broader
definition, not limited to authorizations [15]: “Trust management is the activity
of collecting, encoding, analyzing and presenting evidence relating to compe-
tence, honesty, security or dependability with the purpose of making assess-
ments and decisions regarding trust relationships”. Two main approaches are
currently available for managing trust: policy-based and reputation-based trust
management.
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2.1 Policy-based Trust Management
This approach has been proposed in the context of open and distributed services
architectures [7, 20, 14, 5, 8] as well as in the context of Grids [4] as a solution
to the problem of authorization and access control in open systems. The focus
here is on trust management mechanisms employing different policy languages
and engines for specifying and reasoning on rules for trust establishment. The
goal is to determine whether or not an unknown user can be trusted, based on
a set of credentials and a set of policies.
In addition, it is possible to formalize trust and risk within rule-based policy
languages [25, 16] in terms of logical formulae that may occur in rule bodies.
Currently, policy-based trust is typically involved in access control decisions.
Declarative policies are very well suited to specifying access control conditions
that are eventually meant to yield a boolean decision (the requested resource
is either granted or denied). Systems enforcing policy based trust typically
use languages with well-defined semantics and make decisions based on “non-
subjective” attributes (e.g., requester’s age or address) which might be certified
by certification authorities (e.g., via digital credentials). In general, policy-based
trust is intended for systems with strong protection requirements, for systems
whose behavior is guided by complex rules and/or must be easily changeable, as
well as for systems where the nature of the information used in the authorization
process is exact.
2.2 Reputation-based Trust Management
This approach has emerged in the context of electronic commerce systems, e.g.
eBay. In distributed settings, reputation-based approaches have been proposed
for managing trust in public key certificates, in P2P systems, mobile ad-hoc
networks, and, very recently, in the Semantic Web. The focus here is on trust
computation models capable to estimate the degree of trust that can be invested
in a certain party based on the history of its past behavior.
The main issues characterizing the reputation systems are the trust metric
(how to model and compute the trust) and the management of reputation data
(how to securely and efficiently retrieve the data required by the trust compu-
tation) [2].
Marsh [22] made one of the early attempts at formalizing trust using simple
trust metrics based on linear equations. This model has been further extended
by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes to address reputation-based trust in virtual com-
munities [1]. A number of reputation mechanisms for P2P systems, such as [2,
10, 18, 12], followed similar trust and reputation models.
Typically, reputation-based trust is used in distributed networks where a sys-
tem only has a limited view of the information in the whole network. New trust
relationships are inferred based on the available information (following the idea
of exploiting world’s information). In these scenarios, the available information
is based on the recommendations and the experiences of other users, and it is
typically not signed by certification authorities but (possibly) self-signed by the
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source of the statement. This approach supports trust estimates with a wide,
continuum range and allows the propagation of trust (e.g., transitive propaga-
tion) along the network as well as weighting of values (e.g., fresher information
vs. older information).
3 Security Issues of Relevance
Grid environments provide the middleware needed for access to distributed com-
puting and data resources. Distinctly administrated domains form virtual orga-
nizations and share resources for data retrieval, job execution, monitoring, and
data storage. Such an environment provides users with seamless access to all
resources they are authorized to. In current Grid infrastructures, in order to be
granted access at each domain, user’s jobs have to secure and provide appro-
priate digital credentials for authentication and authorization. However, while
authentication along with single sign-on can be provided based on client delega-
tion of X.509 proxy certificates [26] to the job being submitted, the authorization
mechanisms are still mainly identity based. Due to the large number of poten-
tial users and different certification authorities, this leads to scalability problems
calling for a complementary solution to the access control mechanisms specified
in the current Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [17].
Current authentication and authorization mechanisms in the Grid are too
rigid and do not scale. For example, there are some general implicit assumptions
which are necessary for a submitted job to succeed:
– One credential for all. A job is submitted together with a proxy certificate
signed by a Certification Authority (CA) which is further used to authen-
ticate to other resources. This assumes that all resources must trust such a
CA.
– Identity Based Authorization. Resources, where a job is allowed access, have
to know in advance the identity of the certificate.
– Simple Authentication/Authorization. It is based on a one-shot process where
the job requests access and the resource grants or denies it.
– Manual Credential Fetching. Users need to find out in advance which cre-
dentials are required to access each resource and program their jobs to fetch
and give these credentials while authenticating/requiring authorization.
Some of them have recently been subject of research in order to relax them.
Still, these requirements become liabilities when the Grid grows more complex
and the number of resources a job has to access increases. Mapping identities
raises serious scalability problems due to the large number of potential users,
even more when we take into account the difficult requirement of having a single
trusted Certification Authority (which is hard enough to have within one Grid
and not feasible when trying to integrate different Grids). Because of these rea-
sons, property based certificates have started to appear (PRIMA [21], VOMS [3],
CAS [24] and X.509 attribute certificates [13]) even though there is no standard
interface for using them yet. Furthermore, access control is not a simple task, as
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both a job and a resource might want to specify constraints in the way they dis-
close their certificates. This asks for extension of the usual one-shot mechanism
to an iterative process where the level of trust increases at each iteration [27].
Finally, resources should advertise the credentials they require thus allowing the
job to perform dynamic credential fetching. This not only frees job owners of
“what resource requires what credential” problem 1 or that of coding credential
fetching within their jobs but also allows dynamic selection of resources as they
would be self explanatory in terms of authorization requirements.
We argue that Grid with support for specifying, advertising and enforcing ser-
vice level access control policies together with capabilities for automatic fetching
of credentials can indeed suit large scale collection of resources, enabling dynamic
negotiation for authorization and access granting based on parties properties.
Therefore, we propose a scheme in which grid services advertise their autho-
rization requirements as access control policies, clients are able to query for these
policies and fulfill them through automatic credential fetching. Credentials can
be protected by policies that have to be satisfied by the requesting part before
having the credential revealed. Acting in a self describing environment, services
and clients automatically negotiate authorization by iteratively increasing their
trust relationship through credential disclosure until a decision regarding autho-
rization can be made. This approach can be easily implemented e.g. on top of
the Globus Toolkit 4.0 [9].
4 Trust Issues of Relevance
The general notion of “trust” is excessively complex, and appears to have many
different meanings depending on how it is used. There is also no consensus in the
computer and information sciences literature on a general definition of “trust” -
although its importance has been widely recognized in the increasing number of
publications that utilize it. Using trust as a basis for decision making has been
widely cited by many authors however, and this is the primary motivation on
which we base our definition. We may therefore define trust as:
Definition 1. Trust of a party A to a party B for a service X is the measurable
belief of A in that B behaves dependably for a specified period within a specified
context (in relation to service X)
According to this definition, trust is evaluated relative to a specific service. In
the simplest case, we may assume that a service provider only offers one service.
Hence, one may associate service trust with provider trust. In cases where a ser-
vice provider offers more than one service, it may be necessary to find some mean
1 Currently, users must keep track of the right/required credential for each resource
he might access. Application needs may be difficult to predict prior to its execution
and the user might not be available when a certain credential is required. On the
other hand providing the application with all user credentials is not feasible as it
may imply revealing sensitive information.
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value of trust, based on each of the services offered. It is also important to note
that different trust relationships appear in different business contexts – hence,
evaluating a reliability context may be different from a performance/execution
time context. The measurement of trust may be absolute (e.g. a probability) or
relative (e.g. dense order). Trust must be evaluated with reference to a ‘period’
– which may be in the past (history), the duration of the service (from now until
the end of a service), future (a scheduled or forecasted critical time slot), or al-
ways. Dependability is deliberately understood broadly to include aspects such
as safety, reliability, timeliness, maintainability. However, some of these aspects
are easier to evaluate than others – for instance, reliability can be measured,
whereas safety cannot.
Trust is therefore a multifaceted issue and may be related to other themes
such as risk, competence, security, beliefs and perceptions, utility and benefit,
and expertise. Hence, a service user may only be interested in evaluating the
trust of a service provider if there is likely to be some risk to the service user
directly. Overall, two main approaches may be deduced from literature. The
first is based on allowing “agents” in a system to trust each other and therefore
there is a need to endow them with the ability to reason about the reliability
or honesty of their counterparts. This ability is captured through trust models.
The second is based on allowing agents to calculate the amount of trust they can
place in their interaction partners. This is achieved by guiding agents in deciding
how, when and who to interact with. An agent in this context refers to either
a service user or a provider. However, in order to do so, trust models initially
require agents to gather some knowledge about their counterparts. This may be
achieved in three ways:
1. A Presumption drawn from the agent’s own experience: trust is computed as
a rating of the level of performance of the trustee. The trustee’s performance
is assessed over multiple interactions to check how good and consistent it is
at doing what it says it will [1,12]. This aspect of trust may utilize a pre-
agreed contract between a service user and provider. Violation of a contract
is likely to impinge on the trust that the service user has in the provider.
This is also, currently, the predominant approach applied in existing Grid
computing projects. A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is established between
a service user and a provider, and trust is then evaluated with reference to
such an SLA.
2. Information gathered from other agents: trust in this approach is computed
indirectly from recommendations provided by others. As the recommenda-
tions could be unreliable, the agent must be able to reason about the recom-
mendations gathered from other agents. The latter is achieved in different
ways: (1) deploying rules to enable the agents to decide which other agents’
recommendation they trust more; (2) weighting the recommendation by the
trust the agent has in the recommender [19] [23]. Such a referral mechanism
may involve a multi-hop interaction.
3. Socio-Cognitive Trust: trust in this case is the capability to characterize
the likely motivations of other agents. This involves forming coherent beliefs
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about different characteristics of these agents, and reasoning about these
beliefs in order to decide how much trust should be put in them [11].
Client agents involved in a Grid system may need to choose between a set of
partners to interact with. This situation arises when a client requires a service,
and multiple providers are available to offer such a service. Selection between
such a set of providers incurs a computational cost – which may increase as
the number of interactions and service execution requests increase. We therefore
define the concept of a “community”, within which participants can interact
with a higher level of trust on each other. In this instance, trust may be viewed
with reference to each of the three criteria mentioned above. A reason for the
formation of such communities may be to reduce the subsequent cost of interac-
tion once the community has been established. An agent may therefore decide
to incur an initial cost to determine which community it should participate in,
what actions it should undertake within the community (its role), which other
participants it should communicate with (its interactions), and when to finally
depart from the community. Based on such an analysis, an agent would have
to pay an initial cost to make some of these decisions. Subsequently, the agent
will only incur an “operational” cost – much lower than that for making some
of these initial decisions. Formation of such communities may be implicit - i.e.
based on analysing interactions of agents and determining the level of trust that
can be placed on other participants, or explicit - i.e. a system administrator may
determine which set of agents must be placed in a community.
4.1 Trust Lifecycle
To better understand trust issues within VOs, we relate specific instances where
trust arises with reference to a VO lifecycle – which includes:
– Phase I: Service (Provider) Identification
– Phase II: Formation and Service (Provider) Invitation
– Phase III: Operation and Service (Provider) Interaction
– Phase IV: Dissolution
In Phase I, the service providers that need to interact are identified. It is generally
assumed that this is undertaken through a manager entity – who is forming
the VO in order to underake a particular activity. In Phase II, the identified
providers are asked to join the VO. This phase may involve negotation between
the manager entity and the providers (or directly between the providers) to
ensure that a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is established between the entity
and each provider (or directly between the providers). In Phase III, the providers
interact to perform the particular activity desired by the manager entity. In
Phase IV, the VO is disbanded. We can now associate particular trust and
security issues within such a VO lifecycle, and this is illustrated in Table 1.
The trust lifecycle therefore involves the following operations – in relation to
a VO lifecycle:
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VO Lifecycle Trust and Security Service Level Collaborative Process
Phase Agreement
Phase I Policy Specification. Verify Identify SLA Requirements Define VO Objectives
Participant Credentials
Phase II Evaluate Trust Negotiate SLA(s) Evaluate Community Trust
using Reputation Repositories and Provision Resources
Phase III Trust Maintenance Monitor SLA Trust based
Record SLA Violations Service Invocation
Phase IV Terminate Trust Update SLA Disengage Resources
Relationship. Publish
data into Reputation
Repository
Table 1. Trust Lifecycle
– Phase I: A policy specification is used to determine the type of participants
that should be allowed to participate in a VO. For each discovered partici-
pant, the credentials of the participant are checked – generally by verifying
the digital certificate (and certificate issuing authority) for the participant.
The SLA requirements for each participant are identified (i.e. the type of
terms which should constitute the SLA), based on the type of service the
participant is providing within the VO. The SLA is also defined with ref-
erence to the overall objectives of the VO – for instance, the VO manager
entity may generate subcontracts for each VO participant depending on the
overall activity for which the VO is being formed.
– Phase II: If no prior experience about interacting with a particular VO par-
ticipant exists, scores from a Reputation Repository may be used to assign
a trust value to each participant in the VO by the manager entity. Based on
these trust values, an SLA is negotiated between entities within the VO. The
manager entity (or each participant) may evaluate the success of fulfilling
SLA obligations based on the trust score assigned to a particular provider.
Resource provision can then be undertaken based on the negotiated SLAs.
For instance, of a manager entity has a low trust score for a particular
provider, it may be necessary to request over provision of a particular re-
source offered by such a provider.
– Phase III: During the operating phase of the VO, the SLAs that have been ne-
gotiated are monitored. Any violation is flagged to the provider, and recorded
for later update of the reputation repository. The type of monitoring tool
used is dependent on the parameters identified in Phase I above.
– Phase IV: Feedback from SLA violations – obtained from Phase III are now
recorded for use by other providers. The SLA established is now formally
terminated, and resources associated with the SLA are released. It is also
possible at this stage to utilise a reasoning engine to evaluate feedback from
Phase III, and generate feedback that covers multiple providers for use by
the manager entity.
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5 Reputation Mechanisms
Whereas trust is generally seen from the perspective of a service user towards
a service provider (or vice versa), we may be “Reputation” as the collective
view of a group of users/providers towards another user/provider. Reputation is
therefore the aggregate trust that a group of agents reveal about other agents.
Reputation mechanisms can be compared with those found in electronic com-
merce systems, such as ebay.com or amazon.com, where users can leave feedback
about a particular seller (in ebay) or about a particular product (in amazon).
Such existing mechanisms do not provide any means to verify the accuracy of
such reputation scores, often allowing one agent to assign multiple (sometimes
conflicting) scores for a particular provider. Nevertheless, the availability of such
scores can provide a useful basis for selecting between providers offering simi-
lar services. The exact incentive structure for an agent to provide such openly
accessible reputation scores needs further work.
5.1 Reputation Repositories
A Reputation Repository is a store that contains aggregate scores for a particular
service (or provider). If such a score is assigned to a service, it is necessary
that some persistent identity exists for it. Hence, it would not be possible to
assign a reputation score to a service instance, only to the algorithm (class file,
executable, etc) from which the service instance has been generated. Hence, the
score provided by a reputation repository is useful only if an agent can make
decision for using the service/provider. Such a repository must be managed by
a trusted third party (i.e. different from the service user and provider agents).
This is similar to the availability of a certificate authority, able to verify the
identity of a user and generate a digital certificate.
6 Conclusion
The term trust has usually different meanings depending on the context in which
it is used. However, two main approaches to Trust Management exist: policy-
based trust management and reputation-based trust management. This paper
describes both approaches and identifies, based on four questions derived from
usage of services within a VO, the motivation for evaluating security and trust
issues within a Virtual Organization in Grid environments. This paper also shows
how managing trust arises in the context of Virtual Organizations lifecycle and
addresses current limitations regarding to resource protection and access control
in the Grid.
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